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In re Bildisco :Rejection of
Collective Bargaining Agreements
INTRODUCTION

Many corporations in the United States are parties to collective bargaining agreements. 1 When faced with financial difficulties, a number of these corporations have filed petitions under
chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 ("Bankruptcy
Code"). 2 Two questions surrounding bankruptcy petitions have
long plagued these businesses and their employees: first, under
what circumstances a bankrupt employer may reject a collective
bargaining agreement; and, second, whether the employer is free
to unilaterally modify the collective bargaining agreement pending a decision by the bankruptcy court allowing it to reject the
agreement. These issues present a serious conflict between two
federal statutory schemes. While the bankruptcy laws may be
interpreted to allow the rejection and unilateral modification of
collective bargaining agreements, the National Labor Relations
3
Act ("NLRA") explicitly prohibits such action.

1. A "collective bargaining agreement" is an employment contract that results from
negotiations, or collective bargaining, between an employer and its employees' representative.
The Supreme Court has recognized the special nature of collective bargaining agreements. "The collective bargaining agreement states the rights and duties of the parties. It
is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the
draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate ..... A collective bargaining agreement is an effort
to erect a system of industrial self-government." United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578, 580 (1960).
2. 11 U.S.C.§§ 1101-1174 (1982).
During the year ending September 30,1983,20,837 businesses filed chapter 11 petitions
for reorganization. Browning, Using Bankruptcy to Reject Labor Contracts, 70 A.B.A. J.
60, 60 (Feb. 1984).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982).
The basic policies of the bankruptcy law are to preserve the funds of the debtor
for distribution to creditors and to give the debtor a new start, while the basic
policy of the labor law is always to encourage creation and enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. Where continued performance of the bankrupt's
obligations to the union complicate the orderly liquidation or reorganization of
the bankrupt, these policies conflict
Comment, Collective Bargainingand Bankruptcy, 42 S. CAL L REv. 477, 477 (1969).
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The urgency of this issue is exemplified by the Supreme Court's
recent decision in In re Bildisco.4 In Bildisco, the Court held
that, notwithstanding the NLRA, the bankruptcy laws do permit
the rejection of collective bargaining agreements. The Court
articulated the standard that must be met before such rejection
will be allowed. The Court also held that an employer is not
prohibited from unilaterally modifying an existing collective
bargaining agreement before permission to reject is granted by
the bankruptcy court.
This note will review the history and policies of the federal
bankruptcy and labor laws, discuss the decisions of the federal
courts of appeals that have addressed these issues, and analyze
the two issues in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Bildisco. The analysis will substantiate the Court's conclusion that
collective bargaining agreements are subject to rejection in bankruptcy, and discuss how the standard that the Court formulated
for rejection strikes the appropriate balance between the bankruptcy and labor laws. This note will argue that unilateral modifications of a collective bargaining agreement before formal
rejection should be prohibited and subject to adjudication by the
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"). This note will suggest that the Court's approval of interim unilateral modifications
of collective bargaining agreements may cause an increase in
labor unrest.
BACKGROUND
The Bankruptcy Code
The Supreme Court has defined "bankruptcy" as that area of
law which regulates the relationship between a debtor and his
creditors. 5 Congress enacted the first Bankruptcy Act in 1898
("Bankruptcy Act").6 This Act was replaced recently with the
4. 52 U.S.LW. 4270 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1984).
5. Bankruptcy is "the subject of the relations between an insolvent or nonpaying or
fraudulent debtor and his creditors, extending to his and their relief." Wright v. Union

Cent. Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 513-14 (1938) (footnote omitted) (quoting In re Reiman, 20 F.
Cas. (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1874) (No. 11,673)).
6. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1-1200 (1976) (repealed 1979)). Numerous amendments were made to the Bankruptcy
Act prior to its repeal in 1978: The Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 909-16; Act of
July 1, 1946, ch. 532, 60 Stat. 409; Act of Sept. 25, 1962, Pub. L No. 87-681, 76 Stat. 570;
Acts of Nov. 28, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-156, 90-157, 90-158, 81 Stat. 510, 511,516; Act of Oct.
19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-467,84 Stat. 990.
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Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 7
Provisions in the Bankruptcy Code apply to individuals, businesses, and municipalities. 8 A corporate debtor experiencing
financial difficulties can seek relief under two different chapters
of the Bankruptcy Code, chapter 7 and chapter 11. Chapter 7
provides for the liquidation of the debtor's assets for distribution
to creditors. 9 In contrast, chapter 11 allows the debtor to continue to operate under a plan of reorganization. 10 The goals of
chapter 11 are to effect rehabilitation of the financially distressed corporation and to allow creditors a greater return on
their claims than they might realize were the debtor to proceed
under chapter 7.11 Chapter 11 is thus often the preferable route
12
for the debtor, the creditors, and the debtor's employees.
7. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982).
8. Chapter 7 (Liquidation), id. §§ 701-766, is available to corporate debtors. Chapter 9
(Adjustments of Debts of Municipality), id. §§ 901-946, is available to municipal debtors.
Chapter 11 (Reorganization), id. §§ 1101-1174, is available to corporate debtors. Chapter
13 (Adjustment of Debts of an Individual With Regular Income), id. §§ 1301-1330, is available to individual debtors.
9. Id. §§ 701-766. The Bankruptcy Act included four different reorganization chapters
for corporate debtors. These chapters were consolidated into chapter 11 in the Bankruptcy Code. The consolidation does not affect the analysis herein.
10. Id. §§ 1101-1174. In the usual chapter 11 reorganization case, the proceeding is
commenced by the debtor's filing of a petition for reorganization. Id. § 301. Upon the
commencement of the case, an "estate" is created, and the debtor's property becomes
property of the estate. Id. § 541(a), (b). After the petition is filed, the bankruptcy court
either appoints a trustee, id. § 1104, or a debtor in possession, id. § 1107, which is usually
the debtor, id. § 1101(1). The debtor must turn the estate over to the trustee or debtor in
possession. Id. § 521(3). Unless the bankruptcy court orders otherwise, the trustee or debtor in possession continues to run the business. Id. § 1108. Any time thereafter, usually
after an assessment of the debtor's financial condition, the trustee or debtor in possession
will file a plan of reorganization. Id. § 1121. This plan designates the claims against the
estate and provides for the manner in which the claims will be satisfied. Id. §§ 1123,
1121-1129.
11. "The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is to
restructure a business's finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its employees
with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders." H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977).
Creditors are grouped according to their claim types for purposes of priority. Secured
creditors have first priority up to the value of their security interest. The remainder of
their claim is satisfied with the claims of general unsecured creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 506
(1982). See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1982) (priorities of unsecured claims).
According to one study, priority creditors recover less than 33% and unsecured creditors
recover a median of 8% of their valid claims when the debtor proceeds through a chapter
7 liquidation. In contrast, when the debtor has completed a successful reorganization,
priority creditors usually recover fully on their claims, while unsecured creditors recover a
median of 19% under one-payment plans and 10% under deferred payment plans. D.
STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRuPTcY: PROBLEM, PRocEss, REFoRm 129-30,142-43 (1971).
12. "The debtor, its creditors and employees, and the public at large benefit from the
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Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code allows adjustment of
the debtor's obligations so as to effect a successful reorganization.13 It authorizes a trustee in bankruptcy to assume or reject
any executory contract of the debtor, aside from certain welldelineated exceptions, subject to court approval. 14 The right to
reject executory contracts evolved from the principle that a trustee in bankruptcy may renounce title to and abandon property
that is burdensome to the bankrupt estate. The right was extended to executory contracts because it would be unfair to creditors to allow the party with whom the debtor had contracted to
reap substantial benefits under the contract, while the other
creditors were forced to make substantial compromises of their

business's survival." In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72, 77 (3d Cir. 1982).
13. Section 365(a) provides: (a) Except as provided insections 765 and 766 of this title
and in subsections (b), (c) and (d) of this section, the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor. 11
U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982). This provision is applicable to cases brought under each of the
Bankruptcy Code's operative chapters. See supra note 8.
The procedure under chapter 7 is different than that under chapters 9, 11, and 13.
Section 365(d) provides:
(d) (1) In a case under chapter 7 of this title, if the trustee does not assume or
reject an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor within 60 days
after the order for relief, or within such additional time as the court, for cause,
within such 60-day period, fixes, then such contract or lease is deemed rejected.
(2) In a case under chapter 9, 11 or 13 of this title, the trustee may assume or
reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor at any time before
the confirmation of a plan, but the court, on request of any party to such contract or lease, may order the trustee to determine within a specified period of
time whether to assume or reject such contract or lease.
11 U.S.C. § 365(d) (1982).
Thus, in chapter 7, it is within the trustee's sole discretion to reject any executory contract, because if he does not act within the prescribed 60-day period, the contract is automatically deemed rejected. Assumptions, however, must be formally presented to the
court for approval, due to the possible drain on the limited resources of the estate resulting from compliance with § 365(b) (1). See infra note 14.
Because the vast majority of cases involving the rejection of collective bargaining
agreements pursuant to § 365(a) are chapter 11 reorganizations, this note will address
the issue only in terms of chapter 11.
14. Section 1104 provides for the appointment of a trustee in chapter 11 cases. 11
U.S.C. § 1104 (1982). A trustee is a court-appointed official who is charged with a fiduciary duty towards the estate and the creditors. Id. § 1106. Section 1107 provides in pertinent part that "a debtor in possession shall have all the rights.., and powers, and shall
perform all the functions and duties ... of a trustee serving in a case under this chapter."
Id § 1107.
to the issue addressed herein, all references will hereinafter be to "debtor in possession,"
unless the context otherwise requires.
Section 365(b)(1), which sets out the requirements for assumption of executory contracts, provides:
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claims.15 This right was first incorporated into the Bankruptcy
Act in 1938 as a codification of prior law. 16 The provision was
reenacted in the Bankruptcy Code at section 365(a). 17 While the
main thrust of the provision was unchanged, Congress added a
detailed list of conditions and details to section 365 which were
8
not formerly present in the Bankruptcy Act.'
The NLRA
The most troublesome problem that arises in connection with
the rejection of executory contracts is in the area of labor relations, an area normally within the sole province of the National
Labor Relations Act.' 9 Congress, in enacting the NLRA, sought
to promote the unhampered free flow of commerce through peace

(b)(1) If there has been a default in an executory contract or unexpired lease
of the debtor, the trustee may not assume such contract or lease unless, at the
time of assumption of such contract or lease, the trustee(A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly cure,
such default;
(B) compensates, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly
compensate, a party other than the debtor to such contract or lease, for any
actual pecuniary loss to such party resulting from such default; and
(C) provides adequate assurance of future performance under such contract or
lease.

Id. § 365(b)(1).
Rejection of an executory contract constitutes a material breach for which the nondebtor contracting party may claim damages. Section 365(g) deals with the effect of rejection.
Id. § 365(g). Where the contract has not been previously assumed, the breach relates back
to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, and the injured party will have a general
unsecured claim under section 502(g). Id. § 502(g). Where the contract has been previously assumed, the breach will be at the time of rejection, and will have priority status
if rejection occurred during the administration of the estate as an administrative expense,
under section 507(a)(1). Id. § 507(a)(1). See 2 COLWER ON BANKRUPTcY § 365.08 (15th ed.
1982) for the consequences of a conversion to chapter 7 under § 1112.
15. In re Minges, 602 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1979). See also 2 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTCY

§ 365.01 (15th ed. 1982).
16. Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575,52 Stat. 909-16. Section 713(1) of the Bankruptcy Act
provided:
Upon the filing of a petition, the court may, in addition to the jurisdiction, powers, and duties conferred and imposed upon it by this chapter(1) permit the rejection of executory contracts of the debtor, upon notice to the
parties to such contracts and to such other parties in interest as the court may
designate.
11 U.S.C. § 713(1) (1976) (repealed 1979). J. MAcLACHLON, THE BANKRUPTCY ACT 141 (7th
ed. 1961).
17. See supra note 13.
18. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982). See also supra notes 13-14.
19. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
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and stability of labor relations. 20 To mitigate industrial strife
and unrest by equalizing the bargaining power with their employers, employees were given the statutory right to organize
21
and bargain collectively through a duly chosen representative.
As a corollary to these employee rights, section 8(a)(5) of the
NLRA imposed upon employers the duty to bargain collectively
with their employees' representative. 22 The duty to bargain, as
defined in section 8(d), prohibits either party from unilaterally
terminating or modifying an existing collective bargaining agreement during its life without complying with the terms of the statute. 23 An employer's failure to bargain collectively constitutes an

unfair labor practice. 24

20.

Section 1 of the NLRA states, in pertinent part:
The denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and the
refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead
to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or
necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce ....
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess
full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are
organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power
of wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive
wage rates and working conditions within and between industries.
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain
recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of
bargaining power between employers and employees.

It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to
mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating
the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
Id. § 151.
21. Id. § 157. See supra note 20.
22. Section 8(a)(5) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer...
to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the
provisions of section 9(a)." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982)
23. Id. § 158(d).
24. An unfair labor practice charge is a complaint filed with the National Labor Relations Board, alleging that the NLRA has been violated.

19841

In re Bildisco

The Conflict Between the Bankruptcy
Code and the NLRA: Kevin Steel
The Second Circuit, in Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v.
Kevin Steel Products,25 was the first appellate court to address
the conflict between section 313(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, the
forerunner of section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, and section
8(d) of the NLRA. 26 The court held that the Bankruptcy Act
gave the courts the power to reject collective bargaining agreements. 27 The court noted that the language of section 313(1) was
broad, and remarked that in similar circumstances the Supreme
2
Court had read the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act literally.
The court conceded that the issue was not a simple one that
could be resolved solely by reading the statute. Yet, the court
found that the conflict was not irreconcilable, reasoning that
when the nature of a bankruptcy proceeding is taken into account,
the conflict between the Bankruptcy Act and the NLRA disappears.2
The court held that upon the filing of a petition in bankruptcy
and the appointment of a debtor to operate the business as a

25. 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975).
26. Kevin Steel filed a petition for reorganization under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Act, which is now incorporated into chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. See supranote 9
and accompanying text. Before the company filed its petition, the union filed unfair labor
practice charges against Kevin Steel. See supra note 24. The union alleged that Kevin
Steel had violated section 8(a)(1) by offering to an employee a bribe to abandon the union,
by firing employees on the basis of union affiliation, and by refusing to sign a new
collective bargaining agreement. The NLRB found that Kevin Steel had committed these
unfair labor practices, and ordered Kevin Steel to cease these activities and sign the
collective bargaining agreement. Instead of complying with the NLRB's order, Kevin
Steel successfully moved to reject the collective bargaining agreement in the bankruptcy
court. The district court reversed, holding that section 313(1) did not apply to collective
bargaining agreements. 519 F.2d at 700-01.
27. Several lower courts had already faced the issue and had also found collective
bargaining agreements subject to rejection. See Carpenter's Local 2746 v. Turney Wood
Prods., 289 F. Supp. 143, 147-50 (W.D. Ark. 1968); In re Overseas Nat'l Airways, 238 F.
Supp. 359, 361 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); In re Klaber Bros., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 83, 84 (S.D.N.Y.
1959); In re Public Ledger, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 1008, 1015 (E.D. Pa. 1945), rev'd in part, 161
F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1947).
28. The court referred to two Supreme Court decisions in which the Court had interpreted the Bankruptcy Act literally, although a different conclusion would have been
reached under the NLRA. The Court had held that employer contributions to a union
welfare fund are not wages under section 64(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, even though
such fringe benefits are wages under the NLRA, in United States v. Embassy Restaurant, 359 U.S. 29, 33 (1959). The Court reached the same conclusion with respect to
employer contributions to an annuity plan in Electrical Indus. Joint Bd. v. United States,
391 U.S. 224 (1968). Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 703.
29. 519 F.2d at 703.
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debtor in possession, a new entity, separate and distinct from the
pre-bankruptcy debtor, is created. 30 The court reasoned that
because the debtor in possession is a different entity than the
debtor, it is not a party to the debtor's collective bargaining
agreement, and is not bound by the provisions of section 8(d) of
the NLRA. 31 This new entity, armed with the right to reject
executory contracts, however, is also saddled with new obligations. Among these obligations is the duty to bargain with the
employees' representative. 32 Since the debtor in possession is a
party to any collective bargaining agreement that results from
these negotiations, section 8(d) would govern the agreement's
termination or modification. In any event, under the new entity
theory, unless the debtor in possession expressly assumes or
enters into a new collective bargaining agreement, it is not a
party to the contract, and consequently does not need to comply
with section 8(d).

30. Id. at 704. See supra note 14. The "new entity theory," as it has been termed, has
been accepted by many courts since Kevin Steel. See, e.g., In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72 (3d
Cir. 1982); Local Joint Executive Bd. v. Hotel Circle, Inc., 613 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1980);
Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1975); Matter of Alan Wood Steel Co., 449 F. Supp. 165 (E.D.
Pa. 1978); Matter of Gray Truck Line Co., 34 Bankr. 174 (M.D. Fla. 1983); In re S. Elecs.
Co., 23 Bankr. 248 (E.D. Tenn. 1982); In re St. Croix Hotel Corp., 18 Bankr. 375 (V.I. D.
1982). In Hotel Circle, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that while the theory "is not inexorable
and is based on a policy choice which emphasizes the changed status of the debtor in
bankruptcy for purposes of analyzing its obligation under 8(d)," it is a valuable concept

in this area, since it would be "anomolous" to bind the receiver to the collective bargaining agreement when a successor employer is not bound. Hotel Circle, 613 F.2d at 214.
Nevertheless, the court found that the policy of giving the debtor a fresh start was a more
persuasive reason for not automatically imposing a collective bargaining agreement on
the receiver. For present purposes, a receiver under the Bankruptcy Act is identical to a
trustee or debtor in possession under the Bankruptcy Code. Bankruptcy courts are now
prohibited from appointing receivers. 11 U.S.C. § 105(b) (1982). The new entity theory has
not been without criticism, however. See Matter of Brada Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d
890 (11th Cir. 1983); In re Price Chopper Supermarkets, 19 Bankr. 462 (S.D. Cal. 1982).
See also Note, The Labor-Bankruptcy Conflict: Rejection of a Debtor's Collective Bargaining Agreement, 80 MICH. L. REv. 134,142-48 (1981); infra note 76. The Supreme Court
has held that the debtor in possession is not a new entity for purposes of rejecting collective bargaining agreements. Bildisco, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4274. See infra note 95.
31. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
32. The Kevin Steel court suggested that this new entity's position may be analogous
to that of a successor employer. 519 F.2d at 704. The Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Burns
Int'l Sec. Serv., 406 U.S. 272 (1972), set forth the rights and duties of a successor employer
under the NLRA. The Court held that "where the bargaining unit remains unchanged
and a majority of the employees hired by the new employer are represented by a recently
certified bargaining agent," sections 8(a)(5) and 9(a) of the NLRA require the successor
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The Kevin Steel court refused to interpret congressional silence
as rendering collective bargaining agreements immune from the
provisions of section 313(1), for two reasons. 33 First, the court
noted that Congress was capable of restricting the scope of the
section, as it did with collective bargaining agreements formed
under the Railway Labor Act in railroad reorganizations. 34 The
court refused to assume that the special treatment afforded rail
employees should be extended to all employees, because the circumstances and problems of rail employees are distinct from
those in other industries. 35 Second, the court found it significant
employer to bargain with the employees' representative. 406 U.S. at 281. It did not follow,
however, that the successor employer was "bound to observe the substantive terms of the
collective bargaining contract the union had negotiated with [the predecessor] to which
[the successor] had in no way agreed." Id. at 281-82. The duty to bargain arises from the
voluntary take-over of a certified bargaining unit, not from the existence of a collective
bargaining agreement. Id. at 287. Moreover, section 8(d) expressly provides that the duty
to bargain "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). It would be inconsistent with this congressional
mandate of bargaining freedom to require the successor to adopt specific contractual provisions against his will. Furthermore, binding the successor employer or the union to the
terms of the old collective bargaining agreement.
[M]ay result in serious inequities. A potential employer may be willing to take
over a moribund business only if he can make changes in corporate structure,
composition of the labor force, work location, task assignment, and nature of
supervision. Saddling such an employer with the terms and conditions of
employment contained in the old collective bargaining agreement may make
these changes impossible and may discourage and inhibit the transfer of capital. On the other hand, a union may have made concessions to a small or failing employer that it would be unwilling to make to a large or economically
successful firm. The congressional policy manifest in the Act is to enable the
parties to negotiate for any protection either deems appropriate, but to allow the
balance of bargaining advantage to be set by economic power realities. Strife is
bound to occur if the concessions that must be honored do not correspond to the
relative economic strength of the parties.
Burns Int'l, 406 U.S. at 287-88. For a complete exposition of pre-Burns successorship law,
see Comment, Collective Bargaining and Bankruptcy, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 477, 488-91
(1969).
33. Nothing in the Bankruptcy Act or the NLRA, nor in the legislative history of
either statute, lends any guidance as to Congress's intent as to the treatment of collective
bargaining agreements in the bankruptcy setting. The enactment of the Bankruptcy
Code shed no light on the subject. Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 705.
34. See supranote 14 and accompanying text. It is probable that Congress was aware
of possible conflicts between the Bankruptcy Act and the NLRA as evidenced by the fact
the Congress specifically provided in section 15 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 165 (1982), and
section 272 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 672 (1976) (repealed 1979), that the NLRA
shall prevail. Moreover, section 606 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 606 (1976) (codified
at 11 U.S.C. § 1109 (1982)), permits a union or other representative of the debtor's
employees to be heard on the economic soundness of a plan that affects the employees'
interests.
35. The court cited International Assoc. of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 15

that while Congress had repeatedly amended both the Bankruptcy Act and NLRA, neither statute had been changed to rec36
oncile the clash between them.
The Kevin Steel court was not persuaded by the union's argument that if collective bargaining agreements could be rejected
under section 313(1), businesses would take unfair advantage of
this power by filing petitions in bankruptcy merely to rid themselves of their collective bargaining agreements.37 In light of the
"harsh" consequences which resulted from a bankruptcy proceeding, the court found it unlikely that many businesses would
find bankruptcy more attractive than operating under a collective bargaining agreement. 38 Furthermore, experience had shown
that the union's fears were unfounded. Even though lower courts
had unanimously held that collective bargaining agreements
were subject to rejection, businesses had not rushed to the bankruptcy courts in an attempt to reject their collective bargaining
39
agreements.
Additionally, the court noted that it was within the province of
the legislature, not the judiciary, to determine whether collective
bargaining agreements should be excluded from section 313(1).
Upon further observation, however, the policies behind the two
statutes and the nature of employee rights at stake mandated a
different approach to collective bargaining agreements than that

U.S. 682 (1962), in support of its proposition that "[tihe distinct problems of [railroad
employees] and their importance to the national economy are well recognized." 519 F.2d
at 705. Indeed, the Court in CentralAirlines discussed Congress's concern "with minimizing interruptions in the Nation's transportation services by strikes and labor disputes
and [its] successive attempts to establish effective machinery to resolve disputes ..
"
CentralAirlines, 372 U.S. at 687. For a review of the history of the railway labor laws, see
Elgin, J. & E.R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945).
The court said that the special situation of rail employees was evidenced by differences
between the Railway Labor Act and the NLRA. "[Tihe former provides for cumpulsory
arbitration of 'minor' disputes and 'grievances' by a National Mediation Board, and the
latter does not." Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 705.
36. There have been two major revisions of the NLRA since its enactment in 1935:
The Taft-Hartley Act (Labor-Management Relations Act) of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136,
and the Landrum-Griffin Act (Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959),
Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519. See supra note 6 and accompanying text for amendments
to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
37. 519 F.2d at 702-03.
38. Id. at 703. Presumably, the court was referring to the stigma attached to the need
to "go bankrupt" in the business community, and the need to continue operations under
the strict supervision of the bankruptcy court.
39. Id. at 706. See supranote 27 and accompanying text.
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appropriate for ordinary commercial contracts. 40 Thus, instead
of basing the decision on whether rejection of the collective bargaining agreement would improve the financial status of the
debtor, the court held that rejection should be allowed "only after
a thorough scrutiny, and a careful weighing of the equities on
'4 1
both sides.
Finally, the court directed the bankruptcy court on remand to
give careful consideration to the union's argument that the court
should require special evidence in conjunction with the motion to
reject the collective bargaining agreement in light of the pre42
petition unfair labor practice charges filed against Kevin Steel.
This evidence would include proof that Kevin Steel was not
improperly motivated by a desire to rid itself of the union, 43 together with proof of the company's financial condition, the
source of its problems, and the benefit that would be realized by
rejection. The bankruptcy court was asked to carefully weigh the
equities against rejection, including the loss of intangible em44
ployee rights.
REA Express
Within a month of its decision in Kevin Steel, the Second Circuit was again called upon to determine the propriety of allowing

40.

The court stated:
In relieving a debtor from its obligations under a collective bargaining agreement, it may be depriving the employees affected of their seniority, welfare and
pension rights, as well as other valuable benefits which are incapable of forming the basis of a provable claim for money damages. That would leave the
employees without compensation for their losses, at the same time enabling the
debtor, at the expense of the employees, to consummate what may be a more
favorable plan of arrangement with its other creditors.
Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 707 (quoting In re Overseas Nat'l Airways, 238 F. Supp. 359,
361-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1965)). It has been suggested that the addition of section 502(c), 11
U.S.C. § 502(c) (1982), to the Bankruptcy Code eliminates this concern. 2 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY § 365.03 (15th ed. 1982). But see infra note 132 and accompanying text.
41. Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 707 (quoting Overseas Nat'l, 238 F. Supp. at 361).
42. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
43. There has been some disagreement among the courts about this requirement.
Some courts state that Kevin Steel requires the debtor to show that he is not improperly
motivated in every case. E.g., Matter of Brada Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890, 901 (11th
Cir. 1983); In re Figure Flattery, Inc., 88 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 11,850 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Other
courts say such evidence is relevant only where there is evidence of unfair labor practices,
which give rise to an inference of improper motivation. E.g., In re Kirkpatrick, 34 Bankr.
767 (E.D. Cal. 1983).
44. Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 707.
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a debtor to reject a collective bargaining agreement. 45 In Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks v. REA Express,
Inc.,46 the court reiterated its new entity theory, and determined
that it also applied in situations where the collective bargaining
agreement was formed under the Railway Labor Act. 47 The
court held that collective bargaining agreements formed under
the Railway Labor Act should receive treatment identical to
those formed under the NLRA. 48 Purporting to restate its position in Kevin Steel, the court said that the Bankruptcy Act and
the Railway Labor Act could be accommodated by allowing the
rejection of a collective bargaining agreement where, after carefully weighing all of the equities involved, 49 a court could conclude that an onerous and burdensome collective bargaining

45. Kevin Steel was argued on June 11, 1975, and decided on July 24, 1975; REA
Express was argued on June 27, 1975, and decided on Aug. 27, 1975.
46. 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073(1975).
REA Express filed a petition for reorganization under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act,
and moved to reject two collective bargaining agreements governed by the Railway

Labor Act ("RLA"). As in the NLRA, employers are prohibited from changing the "rates
of pay, rules or working conditions of its employees," 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1949), except as
prescibed in the statute. The bankruptcy court disallowed rejection, finding that "this is
not the kind of rejection or disaffirmance intended by Congress.... 523 F.2d at 167. The
district court reversed, holding that § 313(1) places no limitations on the type of executory contract that can be rejected. Id.
47. 523 F.2d at 171. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
48. 523 F.2d at 167-68. Although the collective bargaining agreement at issue was
formed under the RLA, § 77(n), the forerunner of § 1167, did not apply in REA Express
because the case did not involve a railroad reorganization.
The REA Express court purported to adopt the Kevin Steel standard, yet the court
substantially changed the test by requiring a threshold showing that the business will
collapse absent rejection. See infra note 50 and accompanying text. But see Matter of
Alan Wood Steel Co., 449 F. Supp. 165, 169 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (Kevin Steel and REA Express
both require a showing that failure to reject a collective bargaining agreement "will make
a successful reorganization impossible."). The lower courts were split as to whether to
follow REA Express. In re David A. Rosoro, Inc., 9 Bankr. 190, 191-93 (D. Conn. 1981); In
re Connecticut Celery Co., 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2847, 2851-53 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1980); In re
Studio Eight Lighting, Inc., 91 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2429, 2430 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Matter of
Gray Truck Line, Inc., 34 Bankr. 134, 177-80 (M.D. Fla. 1983); In re Blue Ribbon Transp
Co., 30 Bankr. 783, 785 (D. R.I. 1983); In re J.R. Elkins, Inc., 27 Bankr. 862, 862-63
(E.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Commercial Motor Freight, Inc. of Ind., 27 Bankr. 293, 296-97
(Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1983); In re Hoyt, 27 Bankr. 13, 14-15 (D. Or. 1982); In re Braniff Airways, 25 Bankr. 216, 218-19 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
49. The court held that the equities include the interests sought to be protected by the
Railway Labor Act. The objectives of the RLA are quite similar to those of the NLRA.
They are set out in section 151(a), which provides:
The purposes of the chapter are: (1) To avoid any interruption to commerce or to
the operation of any carrier engaged therein; (2) to forbid any limitation upon
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agreement would "thwart efforts to save a failing carrier from
collapse. 50 A collective bargaining agreement could be rejected
only where the debtor in possession could show that adherence
to the collective bargaining agreement would destroy any prospects of rehabilitation.
The court noted that the practical effect of section 313(1) in a
chapter 11 case is to force the parties who have executory contracts with the debtor to renegotiate their mutual rights and
obligations. This enables the debtor in possession to maintain
the business as a going concern, and allows the creditors to recover at least a substantial portion of their claims.5 1 The court
reasoned that creditors in a chapter 11 proceeding generally
must relinquish some of their rights under their respective executory contracts. It advised the unions and employees to do the
same, since insistence on strict adherence to the collective bargaining agreement would destroy the debtor's chance to rehabilitate. To act otherwise in such a situation would lead to the demise of the business and frustrate the purposes of the Railway
52
Labor Act itself.

freedom of association among employees or any denial, as a condition of
employment or otherwise, of the right of employees to join a labor organization;
(3) to provide for the complete independence of carriers and of employees in the
matter of self-organization to carry out the purposes of this chapter, (4) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates of
pay, rules, or working conditions; (5) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out of grievances or out of interpretation or
application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.
45 U.S.C. § 151a (1982).
50. 523 F.2d at 169. Rephrased, the court's position is that "in view of the serious
effects which rejection has on the carrier's employees it should be authorized only where
it clearly appears to be the lesser of two evils and that, unless the agreement is rejected,
the carrier will collapse and the employees will no longer have their jobs." Id. at 172.
It is difficult to see how a balancing of the equities would ever be a part of the test
proposed by the REA Express court. If the debtor in possession failed to make a threshold showing that assumption of the collective bargaining agreement would destroy the
prospect of a successful reorganization, a court would never get to the balancing. Alternatively, if the debtor in possession succeeded in making this threshold showing, the collective bargaining agreement should always be rejected, since rejection is preferable to the
employees losing their jobs.
51. See supra note 11 and accompanying text
52. See supra note 49.
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IN RE BILDISCO

The Appellate Decision

In In re Bildisco,53 the Third Circuit was the first appellate
court to address the conflict between the NLRA and the bankruptcy laws under the current Bankruptcy Code.5 4 On April 14,
1980, Bildisco & Bildisco filed a petition for reorganization under
chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, and was authorized to operate the business as a debtor in possession. 55 At that time, nearly
half of Bildisco's labor force was covered by a collective bargaining agreement, which was to expire on April 30, 1982. Beginning
in January 1980, Bildisco failed to meet certain obligations
under the collective bargaining agreement, and, in May, refused
to pay wage increases as provided in the agreement. 56 The debtor in possession moved to reject the collective bargaining agreement in December 1980, claiming that rejection would save the
company $100,000 in 1981.Y The bankruptcy court allowed rejection on January 15, 1981.58

Meanwhile, during the summer of 1980, the union had filed
unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB, complaining of

53. 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982). Bildisco filed a petition for reorganization under chapter
11, and moved to reject its collective bargaining agreement with the union, claiming that
rejection could save the company $100,000 in 1981. The bankruptcy court, unsure of the
applicability of pre-Code law, allowed rejection. 682 F.2d at 75 n.3. While the motion was
pending before the bankruptcy court, the union filed unfair labor practice charges
against Bildisco, alleging that Bildisco had violated section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA by refusing to grant wage increases, to pay pension and welfare contributions, and to turn union
dues over to the union. Id. at 75. See supra note 23. Bildisco failed to answer the complaint. After the bankruptcy court granted the motion to reject, the NLRB entered summary judgment against Bildisco on the unfair labor practice charges. The case before the
Third Circuit was a consolidation of the union's appeal from the bankruptcy court's order
and the NLRB's application for enforcement of its order that Bildisco comply with the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 75-76.
54. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. Several lower courts had already confronted the issues under the new Code. In re Reserve Roofing Florida, Inc., 21 Bankr. 96
(M.D. Fla. 1982); In re Price Chopper Supermarkets, 19 Bankr. 462 (S.D. Cal. 1982); In re
Ateco Equip., 18 Bankr. 915 (W.D. Pa. 1982); In re St. Croix Hotel Corp., 18 Bankr. 375
(V.I. D. 1982); In re Land County Sheriffs Ass'n, 16 Bankr. 190 (D. Or. 1981); Matter of
David A. Rosow, Inc., 9 Bankr. 190 (D. Conn. 1981). In re Ateco was the only case that
took the position that pre-Code case law was not controlling under the Bankruptcy Code.
55. 52 U.S.LW. at 4271. See supra notes 10, 14.
56. See supra note 53.
57. 52 U.S.LW. at 4272.
58. Id.
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Bildisco's pre- and post-petition activities. 59 The NLRB, finding
that Bildisco had committed unfair labor practices by unilaterally modifying the collective bargaining agreement and by refusing to negotiate with the union, ordered Bildisco to comply with
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 60 The appeal
before the Third Circuit was a consolidation of the union's
appeal from the bankruptcy court's order allowing rejection of
the collective bargaining agreement and the NLRB's petition for
61
enforcement of its order.
The court held that collective bargaining agreements formed
under the NLRA were not immune from the operation of section
365(a). 62 The court further agreed with the Kevin Steel and REA
Express courts that, due to the nature of collective bargaining
agreements, rejection should require the debtor in possession to
meet a standard stricter than the business judgment test.63 The
Bildisco court recognized, however, that the REA Express standard reflected a substantial departure from Kevin Steel.64 Find-

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. See supra note 53.
62. The court apparently found no distinction between section 313(1) of the Bankruptcy Act and section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, noting that although "the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement under the new Bankruptcy Code ... is a matter
of first impression in the courts of appeals . . . we have the benefit of both statutory
direction and the decision of other courts interpreting the equivalent section of the former
Bankruptcy Act and the relevant provision of the NLRA." 682 F.2d at 76-77.
First, notwithstanding several judicial decisions holding collective bargaining
agreements susceptible to rejection, Congress afforded collective bargaining
agreements no special treatment. Significantly, Congress did provide detailed
provisions for acceptance of executory contracts such as shopping center leases,
§ 365(b)(3), and regarding transactions in commodities futures contracts, §§ 765,
766. Moreover, one particular species of collective bargaining agreement was
singled out... [in] § 1167, [which permits] an inference that, with this one
exception, Congress did not intend to distinguish collective bargaining agreements from executory contracts in general.
682 F.2d at 78. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
63. 682 F.2d at 78.
64. The Kevin Steel formulation:
[Alccommodates the statutory policies of the Labor Act by demanding a greater
evidentiary showing than for rejection of a typical executory contract, but it
does not erect impossible barriers to rejection of labor contracts in violation of
the policies underlying Chapter 11. It plots a middle course between the possible
extremes, requiring a sensitive weighing of the competing private and public
interests in the context of the particular case.
Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 79. The court held, however, that the standard announced by REA
Express went well beyond Kevin Steel by requiring the debtor in possession to show that
reorganization would be impossible absent rejection. This stringent test must be rejected
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ing the REA Express standard unworkable, the court instead
found that the Kevin Steel standard, requiring "thorough scru-

tiny, and a careful balancing of the equities on both sides,"
reflected the correct balance between the competing statutory

policies.

65

The Bildisco court clarified the balancing of equities test by
suggesting several factors that should be considered by a
bankruptcy court before permitting a rejection of a collective
bargaining agreement. 66 First, the court held that the debtor in
possession must make a threshold showing that the collective
bargaining agreement was burdensome to the debtor. 67 After the
rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, the debtor must
bargain with the employees' representative. Since the employees
retain their right to strike should negotiations fail, a court should
consider the potential impact of a strike on the struggling business. 68 In addition, a court should consider the potential impact

for two important reasons: First, it may be impossible to predict whether or not reorganization can be successfully accomplished until very late in the proceedings. For example, at
the date of oral argument in Bildisco, two years had elapsed since Bildisco filed its petition for reorganization, and it was still uncertain whether the company would be forced
into liquidation. Second, "by erecting an excessive evidentiary barrier to rejection," this
standard might harm the workers it seeks to protect. Id. at 80. If the debtor cannot convince the court prior to confirmation of the plan that it will be impossible to reorganize
while adhering to the collective bargaining agreement, rejection will be disallowed. If the
collective bargaining agreement proves to be detrimental in the future, there is nothing
the debtor can do except go into a liquidation, causing the employees to lose their jobs.
Thus, this test "unduly exalts the perpetuation of the collective bargaining agreement
over the more pragmatic consideration of whether the employees will continue to have
jobs at all." 682 F.2d at 80.
65. 682 F.2d at 79 (quoting Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 707 (quoting Overseas Nat'l, 238
F. Supp. at 361)). See supra note 41.
66. The court cautioned that this list was not intended to be exhaustive. Each case is
unique and may require a consideration of additional, or even different, factors. 682 F.2d
at 80.
67. The Bildisco court's "burdensome" requirement is distinguishable from the REA
Express court's "onerous and burdensome" standard in that the former does not require a
showing that reorganization would be impossible without rejection of the collective bargaining agreement. The Bildisco court required only a showing that rejection will assist
reorganization.
68. Although this distinction may be unimportant, it is interesting to note that Kevin
Steel was rather indefinite on this point, while the Bildisco court phrased this as an
absolute requirement. This appeared to be the accepted view before the Supreme Court
made clear that the debtor in possession is definitely under a duty to bargain after rejection. See Matter of Brada Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890 (11th Cir. 1983); Carpenters
Local Union No. 2746 v. Turney Wood Prods., 289 F. Supp. 143 (W.D. Ark. 1968); Matter
of Gray Truckline Co., 34 Bankr. 174 (M.D. Fla. 1983); In re Blue Ribbon Transp. Co., 30
Bankr. 783 (D. R.I. 1983); In re Concrete Pipe Mach. Co., 28 Bankr. 837 (N.D. Iowa 1983);
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of claims for breach on the debtor, as well as the adequacy of
relief the employees might realize. 69 In this regard, the court
must take into account the sacrifices other creditors were making
to insure a successful reorganization. 70 Finally, the court suggested there were other factors to be considered, such as the proportion of employees covered by the collective bargaining agreement, a comparison of their wages and benefits to others in the
industry, 71 and the good or bad faith of the debtor, the union,
and the employees in dealing with the company's insolvency. 72
The Bildisco court, unlike the courts in Kevin Steel and REA
Express, also dealt with the issue of whether section 8(d) of the
NLRA prohibited the debtor in possession from unilaterally
modifying a collective bargaining agreement in the interim period
between filing the petition and formal rejection. The court noted
that because the debtor in possession was a new entity, not a
party to the collective bargaining agreement, it was free to modify unilaterally the collective bargaining agreement. 73 Accordingly, the court held that the NLRB erred in finding the debtor

In re Commercial Freight, Inc. of Ind., 27 Bankr. 293 (S.D. Ind. 1983); In re Southern
Elecs. Co., 23 Bankr. 348 (E.D. Tenn. 1982); In re Price Chopper Supermarkets, 19 Bankr.
462 (S.D. Cal. 1982); In re St. Croix Hotel Corp., 18 Bankr. 375 (V. I. D. St. Croix 1982).

None of these courts, however, required the debtor in possession to bargain with the
union prior to rejection of the collective bargaining agreement. See infra note 135 and
accompanying text.
Section 7 of the NLRA grants to employees the right to "engage in ... concerted activi-

ties for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ..

" 29

U.S.C. § 157 (1982). This right, along with the debtor's obligation to bargain, remains
intact upon rejection of the collective bargaining agreement.
69. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
70. "The polestar is to do equity between claims which arise under the labor contract
and other claims against the debtor." 682 F.2d at 81.
71. Some courts have voiced the opinion that this factor is irrelevant, "since it focuses
on the pre-bankruptcy business decisions of the debtor's management which, if made in
good faith, are largely beyond the scope of judicial review under the business judgment
rule." Matter of Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc., 702 F.2d 890, 900 n.35 (11th Cir. 1983).
Accord In re Blue Ribbon Transp. Co., 30 Bankr. 783, 786 (D. R.I. 1983) ("The argument
that the contract is fair on a nationwide basis is irrelevant to the issue before us, i.e., is
the contract burdensome to this debtor in possession?" (emphasis in original)); Matter of
Allied Supermarkets, 6 Bankr. 968, 978 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (the proper standard is not
whether the collective bargaining agreement is unusually burdensome, but whether it is
burdensome on the debtor in possession).
72. See infra note 135 and accompanying text. The court made it clear that the burden
of persuading the bankruptcy court that the collective bargaining agreement is burdensome and that the equities weigh in favor of rejection is on the debtor in possession.
Presumably, if the debtor in possession fails to meet this burden, even if the union presents no evidence to the contrary, rejection will be disallowed.
73. 682 F.2d at 82-84.
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in possession guilty of post-petition unfair labor practices.7 4 The
court further reasoned that since rejection of an executory con-

tract would relate back to the time immediately prior to the filing
of a petition in bankruptcy, no collective bargaining agreement
would "effectively exist" after the commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding if the bankruptcy court ultimately allowed
rejection. 75 Thus, the NLRB must await the bankruptcy court's

ruling on a motion to reject a collective bargaining agreement
before it can proceed on post-petition unfair labor practice
76
charges.
74. The court concluded that the NLRB's position depends on its "fundamental misconception" that the debtor in possession is an alter-ego of the pre-bankruptcy debtor. Id.
at 83. "A debtor-in-possession is given powers comparable to those of a trustee, and it is
thus an officer of the court." Id. at 82. The court agreed with Kevin Steel's analogy of the
debtor in possession as a successor employer. See supra note 32.
The court's determination did not affect the NLRB's treatment of pre-petition unfair
labor practice charges. The filing of a petition in bankruptcy coupled with a later rejection of the collective bargaining agreement does not render section 8(d) inapplicable to
pre-petition activities of the debtor.
75. 682 F.2d at 84.
76. Id.
The most recent appellate decision dealing with the rejection of collective bargaining
agreements in bankruptcy is Matter of Brada Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 809 (11th Cir.
1983). In Brada Miller, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the express language of section
365 to include collective bargaining agreements. Moreover, the existence of section 1167
in the Bankruptcy Code demonstrated that Congress was fully capable of removing certain labor agreements from the general power of the bankruptcy courts to allow rejection
of executory contracts. See supra note 14. Despite numerous amendments, Congress has
not excluded collective bargaining agreements from the scope of section 365(a). See supra
notes 6, 36, and accompanying text.
Interestingly, while the Brada Miller court agreed with the Second and Third Circuits
that a debtor in possession may reject a collective bargaining agreement, it found the
new entity theory untenable. In the court's opinion, the theory was merely a legal fiction,
developed in an attempt to avoid the dispute between the Bankruptcy Code and the
NLRA. The court recognized that "the debtor in possession may constitute a 'new juridical entity' for some purposes," one "obvious example" being the broad powers granted to
it under the Bankruptcy Code. 702 F.2d at 895. The debtor, however, is "indistinquishable
from the pre-bankruptcy corporation as far as concerns their respective obligations under
the collective bargaining agreement and the labor laws that regulate the formation,
existence, and termination of such agreements." Id.
The greatest problem with the theory, according to the Brada Miller court, is its inconsistency with the fact that the debtor in possession, not a "party" to the collective bargaining agreement, must apply to the court for permission to reject the collective bargaining agreement. The court reasoned that if the debtor in possession was really a new
entity, and not a party to the contract, then the contract should be deemed rejected upon
the filing of a petition in bankruptcy. The statute should then allow the debtor discretionary power to assume the contract of the pre-bankruptcy entity. Id. at 895. If a court
disallows rejection, a debtor in possession is bound retroactively to the contract from the
time of filing the petition. See supranote 14. No legal theory has been advanced to justify
binding a non-party to a collective bargaining agreement. In such a situation, the fact
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The Supreme Court Decision

The Standard for Rejection of Collective
Bargaining Agreements
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Third Circuit's
opinion as to the standard to be applied in allowing the rejection
that the debtor may be liable for breaches of the collective bargaining agreement in the
interim between filing its petition and rejection is irreconcilable with the new entity theory. 702 F.2d at 895. See supra note 14. The court argued that the viability of the theory
was contingent upon allowing rejection of the contract.
The court pointed to the Second Circuit's attempt to restrict the theory to cases involving rejection of collective bargaining agreements where section 8(d) was alleged to preclude rejection except in accordance with its terms. The court reasoned, however, that no
logical distinction could be raised between collective bargaining agreements and other
executory contracts that would justify this restriction. "The more the theory is forcibly
restricted to a particular legal situation, the more apparent becomes its character as a
'legal fiction.' " 702 F.2d at 896. Nevertheless, the court noted, the analogy drawn
between the debtor and a successor employer is not without validity. One justification for
not binding successor employers to the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements applies in the context of a chapter 11 reorganization. Just as binding successor
employers to the collective bargaining agreements of their predecessors might restrict the
"alienability of business enterprises and therefore frustrate the most efficient use of the
nation's resources," it may be impossible for a bankrupt business undergoing a reorganization to attract fresh management and investors if a burdensome collective bargaining
agreement cannot be rejected. Id. at 897 (quoting Burns Intl, 406 U.S. at 287-88). Without
such help, it may be impossible to rehabilitate the business, and the goals of chapter 11
would be defeated. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
Nonetheless, the court held that too many interests were at stake in a chapter 11 reorganization to conclude that the continuation of a collective bargaining agreement should
be of paramount importance, immune from the flexibility that section 365(a) provides.
Although employees covered by the collective bargaining agreement arguably have
interests superior to those of other affected parties, they can best be protected by a
balancing test, rather than a blanket prohibition from rejecting collective bargaining
agreements. The court agreed with Bildisco that the Kevin Steel standard, advocating "a
thorough scrutiny, and a careful weighing of the equities on both sides," best accommodated the myriad of interests involved in a chapter 11 reorganization. See supra note 11.
The court substantially recapped the Bildisco court's list of appropriate factors which
should be considered in weighing the equities. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying
text. The Brada Miller court also suggested some additional considerations. First, a court
should consider the possibility of liquidation, both with and without the rejection, and a
weighing of the impact it would have on each party involved. The court cautioned that
this is only one factor, and although it may be the most important consideration in some
cases, it should not be of such paramount importance as the REA Express court held:
In many instances, the threat of liquidation with its incumbent loss of jobs and
default on debts will properly constitute the principal factor in a judge's decision to allow rejection. We mean only to stress that this factor alone should not
be decisive absent some consideration of the other interests involved.
702 F.2d at 899 n.26. The Brada Miller court further suggested that the "cost-spreading
abilities of the parties" should be considered before allowing rejection of a collective bargaining agreement. In other words, the losses the employees would incur from the rejection of the collective bargaining agreement should be compared to the losses other creditors and the debtor would suffer from its assumption. The court should then determine
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of collective bargaining agreements. 77 The Court agreed that collective bargaining agreements are executory contracts, and that
the detailed text of section 365 refutes any inference that, due to
their special nature, collective bargaining agreements should be
exempt from the ambit of that section.7 8 Nonetheless, the Court
held that the special nature of the collective bargaining agreement mandated a standard stricter than that governing the
79
rejection of ordinary commercial contracts.
The Court found, however, that the stringent REA Express
standard, which would allow rejection only upon a showing that
adherence to the collective bargaining agreement would destroy
the debtor's prospects of rehabilitation, was "fundamentally at
odds" with the overall scheme of flexibility and equity embodied
in chapter 11.80 The Court recognized that the rights of employees under collective bargaining agreements were important.
Yet the REA Express standard unduly subordinated the myriad
of competing considerations to the single issue of whether the
collective bargaining agreement must be rejected to prevent liquidation. Such a standard presented evidentiary difficulties that

which group would best be able to bear these losses.

77. 52. U.S.L.W. 4270, 4273-74 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1984). See supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. As an amicus, the United Mine
Workers of America argued to the Court that a collective bargaining agreement is not an
executory contract within the meaning of section 365(a). The Supreme Court, however,
rejected this argument, recognizing that "at any point during the life of the contract,
performance was due by both parties." 52 U.S.L.W. at 4273 n.6.
79. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
80. 52 U.S.L.W. at 4273. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. The NLRB argued
that Congress intended to adopt the standard announced in REA Express. In the legislative history of section 82 of the Bankruptcy Act, which provided for the rejection of executory contracts in municipal bankruptcies, the report of the House Committee on the Judiciary referred to Kevin Steel and REA Express for the proposition that a stricter standard
than the "business judgment" test was necessary to reject a collective bargaining agreement. H.R. REP. No. 686, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1975). The NLRB argued that since
section 365(a) is now applicable to municipal bankruptcies, and since Congress has demonstrated an awareness of REA Express, the strict standard announced therein should
be adopted by the Court. Brief for Appellee at 19, Bildisco. The Court disposed of this
argument, stating:
The reference in the House report to Kevin Steel and REA Express also cannot be
considered a congressional endorsement of the stricter standard imposed on rejection of collective bargaining agreements by the Second Circuit in REA Express,
since the report indicates no preference for either formulation. At most, the House
report supports only an inference that Congress approved the use of a somewhat
higher standard than the business judgment rule when appraising a request to reject
a collective bargaining agreement.
52 U.S.LW. at 4274.
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would interfere with reorganization. 81
Rather than hold debtors in possession to the stricter REA
Express standard, the Court adopted the lower court's balancing
of equities test first espoused in Kevin Steel.82 Before allowing
rejection, the Court stated that bankruptcy courts should be satisfied that the debtor in possession had made "reasonable efforts
to negotiate a voluntary modification" of the collective bargaining agreement, but that such efforts were not likely to satisfactorily resolve the problem. 83 Such a requirement, the Court reasoned, was necessary to adequately serve the policies of the
NLRA. Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA placed the debtor in possession under a duty to bargain with the employees' representative.84 Moreover, the national labor policy of avoiding labor
unrest and encouraging collective bargaining required that employers and unions reach their own agreements free from governmental interference.85 The bankruptcy court should step into the
bargaining process only when the parties' inability to agree rendered interference necessary to effect a successful reorganization.86
The Court further held that the bankruptcy courts should permit rejection only in furtherance of the chapter 11 policy of successful rehabilitation.a7 The Court stated that determining whether this goal would be served involved balancing the interests of
the debtor, the employees, and the other creditors.88 In this
respect, the courts should consider the possibility of liquidation
absent rejection and the impact this would have on the debtor.8 9 The bankruptcy court should also take into account the
reduced value of the creditors' claims that would result from
assumption of the collective bargaining agreement, the impact of
rejection on the employees, and the "qualitative differences between the types of hardship each may face." 90

81. 52 U.S.LW. at 4274.
82. Id. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
83. 52 U.S.L.W. at 4274.
84.
85.
86.

See supranote 22.
See supra notes 20, 21, and accompanying text.
52 U.S.LW. at 4274. The court emphasized that the bankruptcy court need not

determine that the parties have bargained to impasse "or make any other determination
outside its field of expertise." Id.

87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The Court stressed the importance of focusing on the ultimate goal of chapter
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Interim Unilateral Modification of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement
The second issue, whether post-petition unilateral modification
of a collective bargaining agreement constituted an unfair labor
practice, proved more difficult for the Court. In a 5-4 decision, 91 the Court held that the NLRB may not impose unfair
labor practice charges on the debtor in possession for unilaterally modifying the collective bargaining agreement in the interim between filing the chapter 11 petition and the bankruptcy
court's order allowing rejection of the collective bargaining agreement.92 To hold that such interim modifications constituted an
unfair labor practice, the Court said, would undermine the benefit
that section 365(a) bestows upon the debtor in possession 3 The
chapter 11 debtor in possession may decide to assume or reject
executory contracts at any time until the plan of reorganization
is confirmed. 94 Allowing the NLRB to enforce the collective bargaining agreement through unfair labor practice charges would
place the debtor in possession under financial pressure to make a
speedy decision whether to assume or reject the collective bargaining agreement.
The Court further held that, although the debtor in possession
was the same entity as the pre-petition debtor, 95 various provi-

11 in balancing these qualities. "The Bankruptcy Code does not authorize free-wheeling

consideration of every conceivable equity, but rather only how the equities relate to the
success of the reorganization. The Bankruptcy Court's inquiry is of necessity speculative
and it must have great latitude to consider any type of evidence relevant to this issue."
Id.
91. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Burger,
Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor. Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justices White,
Marshall, and Blackmun.
92. 52 U.S.L.W. at 4275-76.
93. Id. at 4275.
94. Id. See supranotes 10, 13.
95. 52 U.S.L.W. at 4274. The Court summarily cast aside the new entity theory, saying that it could
[S]ee no profit in an exhaustive effort to identify [whether "alter-ego" or "successor
employer"] represents the closest analogy to the debtor-in-possession. Obviously if
the latter were a wholly "new entity" it would be unnecessary for the Bankruptcy
Code to allow it to reject executory contracts, since it would not be bound by such
contracts in the first place. For our purposes, it is sensible to view the debtor-inpossession as the same "entity" which existed before the filing of the bankruptcy
petition, but empowered by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code to deal with its contracts
and property in a manner it could not have done absent the bankruptcy filing.
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sions of the Bankruptcy Code led to the conclusion that the filing
of a petition in bankruptcy rendered the collective bargaining
agreement immediately unenforceable. 96 Rejection of an executory contract constituted a breach which related back to the time
immediately before the filing of the petition. 97 The automatic
stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code would operate to stay
any action against the debtor that was or could have been
brought before the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings. 98 Thus, because rejection related back, any actions based
upon such a contract were automatically stayed, and recovery
for damages could be had only through the Bankruptcy Code's
administration of claims procedures. 99 Moreover, since rejection
of an executory contract was retroactive, compensation for interim services provided by the other party to the contract was an
equitable right based on the reasonable value of the services,
rather than a contractual right. 100 "The necessary result of the
foregoing," the Court reasoned, was that from the date of filing
until formal assumption, the collective bargaining agreement
was not an enforceable contract within the meaning of section 8(d)
of the NLRA. 10° The practical effect of allowing the NLRB to
impose post-petition unfair labor practice charges against the
debtor in possession was to force adherence to the collective bargaining agreement. Such a result, the Court said, would directly
contravene the relation back and automatic stay provisions of
10 2
the Bankruptcy Code, and was, therefore, prohibited.

96. Id. at 4275.
97. See supra note 14.
98. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982).
99. See supra note 14. The dissent disagreed with this interpretation of the majority's
opinion.
[Slince the Court does not argue that the automatic stay provision would bar an
NLRB proceeding to enforce § 8(d) or that any award in such proceedings
would not be recovered through the bankruptcy claims adminstration procedures, I fail to see why the Court finds these sections relevant to our resolution

of the issue before us.
52 U.S.L.W. at 4280 n.17. Although the majority's reasoning in this part of the opinion is
not clear, it is difficult to say that they did not intend to argue that the automatic stay
provisions would bar NLRB proceedings.
100. 52 U.S.L.W. at 4275.

101. Id.
102. Id. The Court also rejected the union's argument, not advanced by the NLRB,
that the debtor in possession must comply with the protracted modification procedures
set forth in section 8(d). See supra note 23. Since no enforceable collective bargaining
agreement exists between filing and rejection, section 8(d) procedures for modification are
not applicable, nor is the debtor in possession required to bargain to impasse before seek-
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The dissent, led by Justice Brennan, criticized the majority for
failing to consider the national labor policies of avoiding economic warfare and encouraging collective bargaining in holding
that interim unilateral modifications did not constitute an unfair
labor practice. 10 3 These policies should not be overlooked when
the language of the two conflicting statutes do not "clearly com04
pel" such a result.
The dissent took issue with the fact that while the majority
found that the collective bargaining agreement would become
unenforceable upon the filing of a chapter 11 petition, section 8(d)
prohibited unilateral modifications when a collective bargaining
agreement was "in effect."' 10 5 In the dissent's view, although
enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement was suspended in the interim period, it remained "in effect" within the
meaning of section 8(d) for three reasons. First, the collective
bargaining agreement would support a claim arising out of the
debtor's interim obligations whether it was ultimately rejected or
assumed. 0 6 Second, when the collective bargaining agreement
was rejected, the estate would be liable to employees for the reasonable value of the services they rendered in the interim peing rejection from the bankruptcy court. "Our rejection of the need for full compliance
with § 8(d) procedures of necessity means that any corresponding duty to bargain to
impasse under § 8(a)(5) and § 8(d) before seeking rejection must also be subordinated to
the exigencies of bankruptcy." 52 U.S.LW. at 4276.
The Court did note, however, that "a debtor-in-possession is not relieved of all obligations under the NLRA simply by filing a petition for bankruptcy." Id. The debtor in
possession, as an employer under the NLRA, must still "bargain collectively with the
employees' certified representative over the terms of a new contract pending rejection of
the existing contract or following formal approval of rejection by the Bankruptcy Court."
Id.
103. The dissent found this especially unnerving in light of the Court's resolution of
the appropriate standard to be applied in allowing rejection of collective bargaining
agreements, in which the Court stressed the importance of giving effect to the policies
underlying the NLRA. "Surely, the 'special nature of a collective bargaining contract'
must also be considered when determining whether Congress intended a debtor-inpossession to be able unilaterally to alter its terms." 52 U.S.L.W. at 4278 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
Further, the dissent noted that section 8(d) is to be flexibly construed so as to effectuate
the policies of the NLRA, and that deference should be given to the NLRB's construction
of the NLRA. The majority replied that "while that Board's interpretation of the NLRA
should be given some deference, the proposition that the Board's interpretation of statutes outside its field of expertise is likewise to be deferred to is novel. We see no need to
defer to the Board's interpretation of Congress' intent in passing the Bankruptcy Code."
Id. at 4275 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 4278 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
105. See supra note 24.
106. 52 U.S.LW. at 4279 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supranote 14.
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riod.'0 7 The dissent noted that the reasonable value was usually
found to be the contract rate. Third, courts often referred to executory contracts as remaining in effect until they were formally
rejected. 108
The dissent found that a debtor in possession was an employer
within the meaning of the NLRA, and section 8(a)(5) imposed
the duty to bargain in good faith on employers.' 0 9 Thus, section
8(d), which incorporated the restraints on unilateral modifications of collective bargaining agreements into the definition of
that duty, applied to all employers, including debtors in possession. Since the collective bargaining agreement remained "in
effect" in the interim period, and the NLRA specifically imposed
the duty to bargain on the debtor in possession, the dissent said
that the majority's holding must be further analyzed in light of
the competing policy considerations of the NLRA and the Bankruptcy Code. 110
The dissent noted that the fundamental policy underlying the
NLRA was to avoid industrial strife by encouraging collective
bargaining."' The prohibition against unilateral modifications
107. 52 U.S.L.W. at 4279 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 4279 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent further reasoned:
Even if we could say that the collective bargaining agreement is not 'in effect'

and that the notice and waiting period requirements of § 8(d) are inapplicable,
it does not necessarily follow that the debtor-in-possession may unilaterally
alter terms and conditions of employment. For example, in NLRB v. Katz, 369
U.S. 736, 743 (1962), although the parties had not yet concluded their negotiations for an initial collective bargaining agreement, we held that "an employer's unilateral change in conditions of employment under negotiation is ... a
violation of § 8(a)(5) for it is a circumvention of the duty to negotiate which
frustrates the objectives of § 8(a)(5) much as does a flat refusal to negotiate." In
addition, it has been widely held that an employer generally may not make
unilateral changes in matters that are mandatory subjects of bargaining even
after a collective bargaining agreement has expired.
Id. at 4279 n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
109. Section 2 of the NLRA provides in pertinent part: "When used in this Act ... The
term "person" includes one or more ...

trustees in cases under title II ....

The term

"employer" includes any person acting as an agent of an employer ... " 29 U.S.C. § 152
(1982).
A debtor in possession, by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code, has all the rights and duties
of a trustee in bankruptcy. See supra note 14.
110. 52 U.S.L.W. at 4280 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
111. Id. "A fundamental aim of the National Labor Relations Act is the establishment and maintenance of industrial peace to preserve the flow of interstate commerce.
Central to achievement of this purpose is the promotion of collective bargaining as a
method of defusing and chanelling conflict between labor and management." Id. (quoting
First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674 (1980)). See supra notes 20, 21,
and accompanying text.
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found in section 8(d) was designed in furtherance of this goal, by
replacing economic warfare with agreement. In the dissent's
view, the need for subservience to this policy was not diminished
11 2
in any way by the filing of a petition in bankruptcy.
The dissent found that the policies and provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code did not alter the conclusion that the commencement of a chapter 11 proceeding did not render section 8(d)
inapplicable." 3 Rather, prohibiting unilateral modifications before formal rejection of the collective bargaining agreement would
not jeopardize prospects of successful reorganization. The standard announced by the Court for allowing rejection ensured that
where a collective bargaining agreement was so burdensome
that even temporary adherence to it would endanger the reorganization, the debtor in possession would be able to reject the
contract. 1 4 Indeed, permitting pre-rejection unilateral modifications might cause labor unrest, which was likely to decrease
15
chances for a successful reorganization."
The dissent found unpersuasive the majority's view that prohibiting interim unilateral modifications would undermine the
Bankruptcy Code's efforts to give the debtor in possession flexibility and breathing space. 1 6 Admittedly, such insistence might
force debtors in possession to seek early rejection of collective
bargaining agreements that would, upon further deliberation,
have been assumed. The dissent argued, however, that in the
case of collective bargaining agreements, this danger was "large-

112. 52 U.S.L.W. at 4280 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "I do not think that there is any
question that the threat to labor peace stemming from a unilateral modification of a
collective bargaining agreement is as great one day after a bankruptcy petition is filed as
it was one day before the petition was fied." Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
115. 52 U.S.L.W. at 4280 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Recent events make it clear that the fear of labor unrest resulting from postfiling unilateral modifications is not merely a hypothetical possiblility. For
example, on September 24, 1983, Continental Airlines filed a Chapter 11 petition. The company immediately instituted wage reductions that ranged from 45
to 50%. New York Times, September 28, 1983, p. D6. On October 3rd, Continental's pilots and flight attendants went on strike. New York Times, October 3,
1983, p. B13. Similarly, on April 22, 1983, Wilson Foods Corporation filed a
Chapter 11 petition. Three days later, the company reduced wages by 40 to 50%.
New York Times, May 3, 1983, p. D2. The wage cut prompted a strike in early
June. New York Times, June 11, 1983, p. 31.
Id. at 4280 n.16 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 4281 (Brennan J., dissenting).
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ly illusory." 117 First, because employees had a stake in successful reorganization, the debtor in possession would probably be
able to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement that
would be at least as favorable as the rejected contract. Second,
unions might frequently be willing to forestall impending rejection by entering into negotiated settlements for the interim
period. Thus, in many cases, requiring compliance with section
8(d) in the interim period would not lead to premature rejection of
collective bargaining agreements and, even where it did, the debtor in possession's chances for a successful reorganization were
118
not likely to be endangered.
ANALYSIS

The Standardfor Rejection of Collective BargainingAgreements
A debtor in possession's use of the bankruptcy laws to reject a
collective bargaining agreement presents a serious conflict between two important federal policies. 119 The Supreme Court has
sought to give as much effect to each of these policies as possible, 120 and has formulated a standard for rejection which most
fully meets this objective.
In Bildisco, the Supreme Court correctly held that collective
bargaining agreements can be rejected in a chapter 11 proceeding.12' The lack of any legislative history directly on point has
been a major impediment to the resolution of this question.
Inferences drawn from the Bankruptcy Code and the congressional record, however, support the Court's conclusion that collective bargaining agreements are subject to rejection under section 365(a). 122

117. Id.
118. Id. The dissent did agree with the majority that strict compliance with the protracted procedures set forth in section 8(d) is not necessary before the debtor in possession
can seek rejection, since such a requirement would make rapid determinations impossible. Nor must the debtor in possession bargain to impasse before moving to reject the
collective bargaining agreement. The dissent's position was just that, until formal rejection, the debtor in possession may not unilaterally modify the collective bargaining
agreement without compliance with section 8(d). Id. at 4278 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
119. See supranote 26 and accompanying text.
120. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974); United States v. Borden Co., 308

U.S. 188, 198 (1939).
121. See supranote 78 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. The most convincing evidence is
found in the legislative history of section 82 of the Bankruptcy Act, Pub. L No. 94-260, 90
Stat. 316 (formerly codified at 11 U.S.C. § 402 (1975)). See supra note 80. Section 82 pro-
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Due to the complexity of the issues involved, the reconciliation
of section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code with the NLRA is a
difficult task. The Supreme Court's resolution of this dilemma,
however, successfully gives the maximum possible effect to both
statutes. The Court correctly determined that the REA Express
standard, which placed a very high burden of proof on the debtor
in possession, did not meet this goal. 123 Although the balancing
of equities test set forth in Kevin Steel was not without shortcomings, the Supreme Court aptly used it as a foundation for a
standard which fairly compromised the policies and provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code and the NLRA.

vided that in municipal bankruptcies, which were governed by chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act, the court could permit the rejection of executory contracts. In discussing the
effect of rejection under this section, Congress noted that in some circumstances, the
debtor would be required to renegotiate an executory contract after rejection. A specific
example of such a contract is a collective bargaining agreement.
In some instances, it will be necessary for the petitioner to renegotiate a contract which has been rejected with the approval of the court. Such renegotiation
and formulation of a new contract would, of course, have to be in accordance
with applicable Federal, State or municipal law. For example, if a collective
bargaining agreement had been rejected, applicable law may provide a process
or procedure for the renegotiation and formation of a new collective bargaining
agreement.
H.R. REP. No. 686, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1975). When the Bankruptcy Act was repealed
by the Bankruptcy Code, section 82 became part of section 365. See supra note 7 and
accompanying text. The legislative history of section 365 does not include any similar
commentary. Absent some indication from Congress to the contrary, however, this passage, showing that Congress fully anticipated the rejection of collective bargaining
agreements, applies equally to section 365.
Secondly, the Supreme Court correctly noted that section 365 contains a detailed list of
conditions and special provisions. These were not present in the Bankruptcy Act, and
they reflect the careful scrutiny with which Congress enacted section 365. See supra note
14 and accompanying text. The fact that Congress deliberated over this section, yet failed
to pay special attention to the rejection of collective bargaining agreements formed under
the NLRA, permits an inference that Congress did not intend to single out collective
bargaining agreements from the general power to reject executory contracts. This inference is strengthened by the fact that Congress anticipated the rejection of collective bargaining agreements under section 82 only three years earlier.
Significantly, Congress did exempt one specific type of collective bargaining agreement
from the operation of section 365. See supra note 14. In a railroad reorganization case, the
court's power to allow rejection of collective bargaining agreements formed under the
Railway Labor Act is severely limited to provisions other than wages and working conditions. Congress thus recognized the unique circumstances of railroads and their employees, and made a policy choice to afford this group special protection. See supra note
36 and accompanying text. To extend this carefully circumscribed protection to all collective bargaining agreements would certainly usurp Congress's legislative domain.
123. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. The REA Express standard, which
requires a threshold showing that the collective bargaining agreement is so onerous and
burdensome that successful reorganization will be impossible absent rejection, goes too
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The major problem with the Kevin Steel formulation was its
vagueness. After setting forth its standard for rejection, the
Kevin Steel court suggested that because the debtor had been
charged with pre-petition unfair labor practices, the bankruptcy
court should consider special factors, including the employer's
its diffimotivation, proof of its financial condition, the source of 124
culties, and the benefit that would be gained by rejection.
The Third and Eleventh Circuits sought to rectify this lack of
detail by enumerating factors which should always be considered in determining whether rejection will be allowed. The Third
Circuit in Bildisco held that once the debtor in possession shows
that the collective bargaining agreement is burdensome, a court
should consider the impact of a strike and claims for breach on
the employer, the adequacy of relief the employees might realize,
the sacrifices of other creditors, the proportion of employees
covered by the collective bargaining agreement, industry-wide
comparison of their wages and benefits, and the good or bad
faith of the parties in handling the debtor's financial difficulties.125 The Eleventh Circuit, in Matter of Brada Miller Freight
Systems,126 added that a court should consider the possibility of
liquidation both with and without rejection, and then compare

far to protect the sanctity of collective bargaining agreements and fails to accommodate

the overall spirit of flexibility which chapter 11 provides. Under this test, the debtor in
possession has a heavy burden to meet early in the bankruptcy proceedings. As the Third
Circuit noted, it may be impossible to predict the impact of the collective bargaining
agreement on the reorganization with any accuracy until long after the commencement
of the case. See supra note 64. Very possibly, by the time the effect of the collective
bargaining agreement is certain enough to meet this burden, it will be too late to avoid
liquidation. This is further complicated by the fact that the union may request the court
to set a time limit on the debtor inpossession's motion to reject or assume the collective
bargaining agreement. See supra note 13. The union could thus preclude rejection by
strategically forcing the debtor in possession to move for rejection before it is armed with
the proof necessary to reject the collective bargaining agreement. Rehabilitation of the
business itself, which means the preservation of jobs, is more important than strict
enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement.
Further, the REA Express standard could result in patent unfairness to the debtor's
other creditors. It is a well-established principle that the bankruptcy laws seek to insure
equitable treatment of all creditors, without allowing one group to unfairly take advantage of the others. But see infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text. "[H istorically, one
of the prime purposes of the bankruptcy law has been to bring about a ratable distribution among creditors of a bankrupt's assets; to protect the creditors from one another."
Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 210 (1945). See also Sampsell v. Imperial Paper Corp.,
313 U.S. 215, 219 (1940); Boese v. King, 108 U.S. 379, 385-86 (1882).
124. See supranote 41, 42-44, and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
126. 702 F.2d 890 (11th Cir. 1983).
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the losses the employees would suffer from rejection to the losses
other creditors would incur from assumption to determine which
127
group would best be able to bear those losses.
The Supreme Court recognized, however, that the Kevin Steel
standard, unlike the REA Express standard, provides the flexi128
bility necessary to effectuate a chapter 11 reorganization.
While the REA Express standard went too far in promoting the
policies of the NLRA, the Kevin Steel standard, even as supplemented by Bildisco and Brada Miller, did not go far enough, and
therefore failed to protect employee rights as fully as possible.
Collective bargaining agreements are almost always burdensome to the debtor to some degree. Consequently, it is not difficult to show that rejection will assist reorganization. By not fulfilling its obligations under the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement, which invariably gives employees more than they
would otherwise have, 29 the debtor will have more funds available to run the business and to satisfy the claims of other creditors. While it is generally true that creditors should be treated
equally, 130 this principal must yield to the recognition that
employee-creditors are unique in two regards.
First, many of the employee rights that will be cut off by rejection of a collective bargaining agreement are non-monetary
rights; primary among these rights is job security. 3 1 Even
though the Bankruptcy Code provides that contingent or unliquidated claims shall be estimated for allowance, it is virtually
impossible for monetary damages to adequately compensate for
132
these losses.
Second, the impact of monetary losses on employees caused by
the rejection of the collective bargaining agreement is more
severe than the impact of such losses on commercial creditors.

127 See supra note 76.
128. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 20, 21, and accompanying text. Since a major premise behind
the NLRA is that collective bargaining and protected concerted activity reduce the disparity in bargaining power between employers and employees, it follows that the
employees will gain better employment terms from collective bargaining agreements
than from individual contracts.
130. See supranote 70 and accompanying text.
131. Collective bargaining agreements generally include provisions relating to wage
increases, vacation and sick pay, overtime, contributions to health, welfare, and pension
funds, and seniority.
132. See supra note 40.
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Commercial creditors can usually absorb financial losses by
spreading the risk of loss among their customers. Most employees,
however, depend upon their employers for their sole source of
income. The employees who suffer losses from the rejection of a
collective bargaining agreement are effectively in the class of
general unsecured creditors. 133 This is the last group to receive
payment on its claims, and it is not unusual for these claims to
be largely unsatisfied. Thus, the employees may never recover
their losses, causing a devastating impact on their livelihoods.
The Supreme Court added three factors to the balancing of
equities test that greatly increase a bankruptcy court's ability to
protect the interests of employees. First, before allowing rejection, a bankruptcy court must find that the debtor in possession
has made reasonable efforts to negotiate a voluntary modification of the collective bargaining agreement. 134 This requirement
recognizes the special posture of employees as compared to ordinary commercial creditors, and gives them an added measure of
protection. 135 It not only creates an opportunity for the parties to
reach a compromise free from governmental interference, 136 but
also gives the employees a chance to retain some of their rights
under the collective bargaining agreement, rather than losing
the agreement altogether. 137 Where the union realizes that the
business's financial condition necessitates some concessions, it
will more likely be willing to compromise. This gives the employees greater bargaining power than beginning negotiations anew.
Second, in considering the reduced value of creditors' claims
resulting from assumption of collective bargaining agreements
and the impact of rejection on employees, the Court held that
bankruptcy courts should take into account "any qualitative differences between the types of hardship each may face."' 38 This

133. See supra note 11.
134. See supranote 83 and accompanying text.
135. Although both the Bildisco and Brada Miller courts suggested that the good or
bad faith of the debtor in possession and the union in dealing with the effects of the

business's financial difficulties should be a factor in the court's weighing of the equities,
they stopped short of requiring pre-rejection bargaining. See supra notes 72, 76, and
accompanying text.
136. See supranote 85 and accompanying text.
137. Partial rejection of a collective bargaining agreement should probably not be
allowed, since it would "destroy the internal integrity of the agreement and substantially
upset the relative bargaining positions of the parties." Brainiff Airways, 25 Bankr. at
218.
138. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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requirement recognizes that the monetary loss of rejection would
have a much more detrimental impact on a group of employees
than it would on a group of commercial creditors.
Third, as the Brada Miller court suggested, the possibility of
liquidation, both with and without rejection, should be an important factor in a court's consideration of a motion to reject a collective bargaining agreement. 139 This follows the lead of the
REA Express court by permitting rejection only when necessary
to protect the employee rights at stake. This standard removes
some of the inflexibility inherent in requiring the debtor in possession to show by a preponderance of the evidence that liquidation will ensue absent rejection. If it appears that even with the
collective bargaining agreement, the possibility of liquidation is
not present, the equities will weigh heavily against rejection.
The Application of Section 8(d) to
Interim UnilateralModifications
The majority, by narrowly focusing on the technical provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, failed to adequately address the
issue of whether the filing of a chapter 11 petition immunizes the
debtor in possession from the provisions of section 8(d). While it
first manifests a strong desire to give as much weight as possible
to each of the federal statutes involved, the Court falls short of
this objective. In light of both labor and bankruptcy policies and
provisions, debtors in possession should be prohibited from unilaterally modifying collective bargaining agreements before formal rejection.
The majority held that since rejection of a collective bargaining agreement constitutes a breach immediately before the date
of filing, the automatic stay provisions render the contract unenforceable in the interim period. 140 The Court did not, however,
consider whether unfair labor practice proceedings before the
NLRB fall within the exception to the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provisions.1 4 ' Under this exception, governmental
units are not stayed from enforcing their police or regulatory

139.
140.
141.

See supra notes 76,89, and accompanying text.
See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
Section 362(b) provides in pertinent part-
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powers. The NLRB is a governmental unit. It is the public agent
Congress designated to enforce the NLRA. 142 Furthermore, unfair
labor practice proceedings are an exercise of the NLRB's police
or regulatory powers. 143 Unfair labor practice proceedings have
some of the characteristics of private litigation, since they are
initiated by individual persons or groups. Yet, the Supreme Court
has stated that "[a] proceeding by the Board is not to adjudicate
private rights but to effectuate a public policy.' 144 Thus, NLRB

(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title..
not operate as a stay-

does

(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit to'enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power;
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a judgment,
other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a
governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory
power;
11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (1982). The legislative history clarifies the intended scope of this
governmental unit exception.
Paragraph (4) excepts commencement or continuation of actions and proceedings by governmental units to enforce police or regulatory powers. Thus, where
a governmental unit is suing a debtor to prevent or stop violation of fraud,
environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law, the action
or proceeding is not stayed under the automatic stay. Paragraph (5) makes
clear that the exception extends to permit an injunction and enforcement of an
injunction, and to permit entry of a money judgment, but does not extend to
permit enforcement of a money judgment. Since the assets of the debtor are in
the possession and control of the bankruptcy court, and since they constitute a
fund out of which all creditors are entitled to share, enforcement by a governmental unit of a money judgment would give it preferential treatment to the
detriment of all other creditors.
H.R. REP. No.595,95th Cong., Ist Sess. 342-43 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
51-52 (1978).
142. Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 27 (1952). The Supreme Court further stated
that "a back pay order is a reparation order designed to vindicate the public policy of the
statute by making employees whole for losses suffered on account of an unfair labor
practice." Id.
143. NLRB v. Evans Plumbing Co., 639 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1981) (NLRB order to reinstate with back pay discriminatorily discharged employees was to enforce federal law
regulating the employer-employee relationship and ther9fore an exercise of police or regulatory powers); Shippers Interstate Serv. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1980) (NLRB proceedings are not subject to the automatic stay provisions in a reorganization case); In re
Bel Air Chateau Hosp., 611 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1979) (the conclusion that regulatory proceedings of the NLRB are not subject to the Bankruptcy Act's automatic stay provisions
appears harmonious with the new Bankruptcy Code's provisions); In re D.M. Barber,
Inc., 13 Bankr. 962 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (proceedings by the NLRB are to effectuate public
policy and thus are not subject to the automatic stay).
144. NLRB v. Shipbuilding Local 22, 391 U.S. 418, 424 (1967).
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proceedings to enforce a collective bargaining agreement should
fall within the exception to the automatic stay provisions and
145
should not be affected by the filing of a chapter 11 petition.
As the dissent reasoned, the fact that enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement is suspended does not mean that
there is no collective bargaining agreement "in effect" within the
meaning of the NLRA. 146 The majority's conclusion that collective bargaining agreements are unenforceable in the interim period
is contingent upon the bankruptcy court ultimately allowing
rejection. Since assumption as well as rejection relates back, the
debtor in possession could be faced with unfair labor practice
charges where rejection is disallowed, because the collective bargaining agreement is retroactively binding throughout the interim period. 147 Under the majority's holding, the debtor in possession is forced to predict the outcome of the motion to reject before
he can safely modify the collective bargaining agreement. Not
only will the debtor in possession's interim obligations be
unknown until formal rejection or assumption, but these obligations will vary from case to case. The majority's holding thus
creates an arbitrary and uncertain rule of law.
The majority also attached much weight to the fact that the
Bankruptcy Code gives a chapter 11 debtor in possession a reasonable time in which to determine whether an executory contract should be rejected or assumed. 48 Undoubtedly, requiring
adherence to a collective bargaining agreement in this period
will put pressure on the debtor in possession to make a somewhat expeditious decision. Yet, as the dissent correctly noted,
this is unlikely to endanger the reorganization process. 49 The
majority emphasized that in balancing the equities, bankruptcy
courts must keep in mind that rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement should be allowed only in furtherance of the ultimate
goal of rehabilitation. 15 0 Logically, the same should hold true
with any contravention of the policies and provisions of the

145. Section 362(b), however, does not go so far as to permit the enforcement of a
money judgment against the debtor. See supra note 141. The NLRB would still have to
file a claim with the bankruptcy court to satisfy any monetary judgment.
146. See supranotes 106-08 and accompanying text.
147. American A. & B. Coal Corp. v. Leonardo Arrivabene, S.A., 280 F.2d 119, 124 (2d
Cir. 1960); In re Italian Cook Oil Corp., 190 F.2d 994,996-97 (3d Cir. 1951).
148. See supranotes 93, 94, and accompanying text.
149. See supranotes 116, 118, and accompanying text.
150. See supranote 87 and accompanying text.
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NLRA. In keeping with the Court's own warning, this attempt to
give the debtor in possession flexibility should be subordinated
to the NLRA's policy of encouraging and enforcing collective
bargaining agreements, since it is not necessary to protect the
underlying goal of successful rehabilitation.
The majority's holding fails to give adequate consideration to
the fundamental policies and goals of the NLRA. Congress recognized that collective bargaining was necessary to avoid industrial strife and economic warfare. 151 The imposition of the duty
to bargain collectively, however, would be meaningless without
the further prohibition against unilateral modifications of collective bargaining agreements. The employer's right to abrogate a
collective bargaining agreement would not only undermine any
protection the NLRA affords employees, but is likely to spur
retaliatory action on the part of frustrated employees. 152 As the
dissent notes, such a result is ultimately likely to decrease a debtor's chances of rehabilitation.
Moreover, the filing of a petition in bankruptcy does not
relieve a debtor in possession, as an employer, of its obligations
under the NLRA.1 53 Thus, after formal rejection of a collective
bargaining agreement, the debtor in possession is still under a
duty to bargain collectively with the employees' representative in
satisfaction of section 8(a)(5).1 54 It is inconsistent with this position to allow debtors in possession to circumvent the prohibition
against unilateral modifications, an integral part of the duty to
bargain, when circumvention is not necessary to ensure successful reorganization. While the "exigencies of bankruptcy" do
render the protracted notice and cooling off requirements of section 8(d) unworkable,1 55 an expedited approach to interim modifications would most fairly accommodate the two statutory
schemes. Such an approach would protect NLRA policies and
safeguard employee rights, without jeopardizing the debtor in
possession's prospects of rehabilitation.
The majority opinion now requires the debtor in possession to
make reasonable efforts to reach a negotiated settlement with
the union before requesting permission to reject the collective

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See
See
See
See
See

supra notes 20, 21, and accompanying text.
supra note 122 and accompanying text.
supra notes 68, 84.
supra note 22 and accompanying text.
supra note 23.
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bargaining agreement. 156 To require the debtor in possession to
adhere to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement before
a negotiated settlement or formal rejection would not substantially increase the burden. The possibility of an increase in the
estate's liabilities caused by this temporary adherence to the collective bargaining agreement is outweighed by the detrimental
impact of unilateral modifications on the policies of the NLRA
and the employees' welfare.
BILDIsCO's IMPACT
The Supreme Court's holding that collective bargaining agreements may be rejected in bankruptcy where the equities weigh in
favor of rejection is not likely to have a great impact in the areas
of bankruptcy and labor relations. Prior to the Court's decision,
most bankruptcy courts were taking a similar approach when
confronted with motions to reject collective bargaining agreements. Given the interruptions of a business's operations when it
files a chapter 11 petition and the requirement that new agreements be negotiated once rejection is allowed, it is improbable
that bankruptcy filings will be increased by employers whose
sole desire is to circumvent their collective bargaining agreements. The apparent increase in chapter 11 reorganizations in
the past several years is more likely attributable to the condition
of the economy rather than to the prospects of rejecting labor
contracts.
By sanctioning interim unilateral modifications of collective
bargaining agreements, however, the Court has opened the door
to the possibility of great unrest in the labor relations area.
Under the Court's holding, employers are free to disregard their
contractual obligations to employees before it is formally determined by the bankruptcy court whether rejection of the collective
bargaining agreement is proper. Employers will be more likely to
wait protracted periods of time before deciding whether to move
for rejection, increasing the length of time the employees will be
without the protection of a collective bargaining agreement. As
the dissent noted, the foreseeable result of this situation is an
increase in labor unrest by employees in response to their employers' capricious and unfair actions.

156.

See supranote 83 and accompanying text.
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On the other hand, were employers prohibited from unilaterally modifying their collective bargaining agreements before
formal rejection, the prospects of labor discord would be substantially diminished. Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision,
employers must attempt to bargain with the union before moving to reject their collective bargaining agreements. With some
indication that the employer is trying to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of its financial difficulties, the impetus behind
157
labor strife would be substantially mitigated.
CONCLUSION
The rejection of collective bargaining agreements in bankruptcy jeopardizes the strong policies underpinning the NLRA.
In order to minimize this threat, courts must move cautiously in
allowing bankrupt employers to reject their collective bargaining
agreements. The standard espoused by the Supreme Court in In
re Bildisco most fairly accommodates the two statutory schemes
while affording greater protection to employees.

157. Prompted by dissatisfaction of the unions and the labor force with the Supreme
Court's decision in Bildisco, Congress enacted Pub. L. No. 98-353 on July 10, 1984. Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 contains a
new section dealing expressly with the rejection of collective bargaining agreements. See
126 Bankr. L Rep. (CCH) 2193 (July 10, 1984).
In enacting the new provision, Congress followed portions of the Supreme Court's holding, while overruling others. The amendment recognizes the importance of fair and
equitable treatment of the debtor's employees without unduly restricting the opportunity
of the bankrupt business to effect a successful reorganization.
Specifically, before moving to reject a collective bargaining agreement, the debtor must
make the union an offer which is necessary to reorganization and fair to the employees.
From this point until the hearing on the motion to reject the collective bargaining agree-

ment, the debtor must "confer in good faith" with the employees' representative, and
attempt to reach a "mutually satisfactory" agreement. Id. (to be codifed at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1113(b)(2)).
If the debtor does move to reject the collective bargaining agreement, a hearing, at
which all interested parties may be heard, must be scheduled within 14 days of the filing
of the motion. Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1113(d)(1)). Rejection of a collective bargaining agreement will be allowed only if the debtor has proposed necessary modifications, the employees' representative has rejected the proposal "without good cause," and,
in the Supreme Court's words, "the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection." Id. (to
be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)).
The Supreme Court's opinion with respect to unilateral interim modifications, however,
did not fare so well in Congress. Section 1113 will allow debtors to modify the collective
bargaining agreement prior to formal rejection in only two situations. First, if the bankruptcy court fails to rule on a motion to reject the collective bargaining agreement within
30 days of the commencement of the hearing, the debtor may unilaterally terminate or
modify any provisions of the collective bargaining agreement pending the court's ruling.
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The Court's sanctioning of interim unilateral modifications of

collective bargaining agreements, however, disregards national
labor policy and fails to adequately protect the employees of
bankrupt businesses. Since permitting such modifications is not
necessary to ensure successful reorganization, employers should
comply with the terms of collective bargaining agreements until
voluntary settlement is reached with the unions or formal rejection is granted by the bankruptcy courts.
CHERYL A. KEHOE

Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1113(d)(2)). Second, the court may authorize interim
modifications after notice and a hearing, if such changes are "essential to the continuation of the debtor's business" or necessary to "avoid irreparable damage to the estate." Id.
(to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1113(e)). In any event, however, the amendment stresses
that no provision of the Bankruptcy code shall be construed as allowing the debtor in
possession to terminate or modify a collective bargaining agreement before complying
with the terms of section 1113. Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1113(f)).

